One naturally thinks of an utterance of a declarative sentence as

expressing a single proposition. In this talk, I am going to present a

train of thought–as opposed to a cogent argument–from a neglected

(possibly unnoticed) puzzle about conditionals leading to the conclusion

that when one asserts a conditional, P > Q (“If P, then Q”), one actually

expresses TWO propositions, one of which is the grounds for the other.

The puzzle (at first pass) is roughly this: one may legitimately hold a

pair of conditionals, A > C and B > C*, where (i) C and C* are

incompatible, and yet (ii) one is undecided about the conjunction A & B.

This is a puzzle because it clashes with the compelling thought that any

conditional P > Q is false if P is true and Q false. Modus Ponens is also

threatened.

→ **Download**.

### Like this:

Like Loading...